Japan: 1868-1968 Episode 10: The Occupation of Japan
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From WFC are five College Radio in Amherst Massachusetts. We present
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Japan 1868 through 1968. This year has been
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officially designated as the centennial of the beginning of the modernization of Japan
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and this is the tenth of a series of broadcasts with Johnny Markey a professor
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of government and vice dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of
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Massachusetts. The title of today's broadcast is the
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occupation of Japan.
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Professor Markey when the war finally came to an end for Japan
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in the middle of August of 1945 the country
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was in an unhappy state. To put it mildly. For the
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first time in almost half a century of military aggression.
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War had been carried directly into Japan and what
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war did to Japan from roughly the beginning of
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1945 down to mid August. Had a great deal to do
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with what was going to occur in Japan for the next few years after the end of the war.
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I would like to sketch out very rapidly some of the principal
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features of the impact of war on Japanese society.
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Well first of all and most obvious was the degree of
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damage and destruction that had occurred as a result of the
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massive air attacks that had been carried out against Japan for more than half a
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year. For one example and perhaps this summarizes the
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damage and destruction. Best of all an estimated 50 percent
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of the built up areas of all Japanese cities was
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destroyed or burned to the ground in most cases. Now
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this meant the destruction of homes the destruction of factories and other
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economic industrial installations and of course the destruction of
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transportation and communications. Now in addition to that of
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course there was the fact that there were some very severe and widespread
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dislocations observable in Japanese society. Obviously the
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economy had been not only destroyed but destructed there were
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grave social consequences of the war and also
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governmental consequences as well. And I'd like to mention some of these
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very briefly. First of all what were some of the economic
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effects. Well by the mid summer of
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1945 there was already a severe food
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shortage in Japan a food shortage that had been developing
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slowly over the past several years indeed since about
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1948. Primary Labor as a result of the disruption of the
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labor force on the Japanese farm. Men and women had to
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go into the factories and of course and then it had to go into the armed services. And
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in an agricultural economy such as Japan's was at that time
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which was dependent to a very high degree indeed on human
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labor. The consequences could not be a food shortage.
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There was obviously a lack of shelter growing out of the bombing the
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damage and destruction of all kinds of housing facilities. There was a great
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shortage of consumers goods. A shortage that had been developing since the 1930s
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because of the absolute demand that the economy
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concentrate on the turning out of military goods of one sort or another.
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And above and beyond these serious dislocations there was what could be described
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as an almost complete economic collapse at the end of the war.
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For the very simple reason that an economy which had been geared to the turning
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out of war materials had to change direction overnight.
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And so in a very real sense Japan's industry ground to a
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halt when the fighting finally stopped. Now what were
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some of the social effects of the war. Well one of the most
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obvious things was that there would had been an extensive disruption of family
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life. This was very obvious because of the massive
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mobilization of Japanese manpower in the
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military services and the departure of several millions of
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these men for service overseas. There was also family disruption
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brought about by the evacuation of cities and indeed the
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destruction of the family house. There was also the
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psychological impact of the war because after all the Japanese people
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had to live in the midst of all this damage and destruction and they were the ones that had to
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suffer the economic dislocations that I just described.
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So that the people themselves in their daily lives their relations
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with each other were to put it mildly disorganized.
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Now also there was the problem of this phenomenon
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that I've been dealing with in the last few lectures namely the
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problem of the militarists and militarism. Now by the summer
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of 1945 one thing had become very obvious in
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Japan namely that the so-called military that is the
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army and navy high command the generals and the admirals and their civilian
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supporters had failed. Not only had they failed in their
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primary responsibility of the prosecution of the war but you know a
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very real sense all of their policy had failed because
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all of the efforts of the government sends roughly 937 onward had been
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directed towards the successful prosecution of the war. The
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consequences were felt in not only in economic policy but in
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educational policy in foreign policy and so forth and so on.
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Now what had seemed early in 1942 to have been a
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glorious culmination of a period of again almost half a
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century of war and aggression had ended in complete failure.
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The policy of aggression had failed militarism had demonstrated within
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Japan itself that it did not contain the answers to Japan's problems
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that the supporters of militarism claimed that it had.
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Now if indeed what had happened was that all of Japanese
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society had become involved in the policies of the
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militarists and all Japanese society had to become
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involved in the failure of that policy. Now on the other
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hand it was perfectly clear that at the end of the
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war the militarists and their civilian supporters were still in power.
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The very fact that the decision to accept the surrender
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terms of the Allies was in doubt until the emperor
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spoke until the Emperor made the final statement that the surrender
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terms had to be accepted was an indication that the grasp of
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the Japanese government on Japanese society had not been shaken.
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At the time there was visible no anti war no anti
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militarist movement inside Japan and indeed
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careful investigation since the end of the war has indicated that there was not anything
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that could be described even as an underground movement directed against either the
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government or its leaders. And the very fact that the
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intense debate over the surrender was carried out in the strictest
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secrecy was another indication of the degree to which Japan's
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leadership remained in control of the country right up to the
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very end. On the other hand this obvious discrediting as I
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emphasized a moment ago was a political fact of very great importance.
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Now also the Japanese government even though it was in great
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difficulties at that time was still in being and
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was still attempting to operate as the administrative
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center of Japanese society. Now it
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was into this broad general situation that
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a new and very significant factor was injected
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namely the occupation of Japan. Now as
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they have been emphasizing the Japanese government decided
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on August 15th Japanese time 1945 to accept the
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surrender terms of the allies. However it was not
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until September 2nd 1945 that the formal
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surrender documents were signed by representatives of the Allied
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powers and of the Japanese government. So technically speaking
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then the occupation of Japan began on September 2nd
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1945 and continued until April 29
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1952 and this period of less than seven
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years was one of the most significant in all of Japan's
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history. Now I'd like to point out very
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briefly why this period was of such great
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significance to Japan. Well in the first place it
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was obviously a military occupation. It
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was a concrete sign that Japan had lost a war
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and not only that but Japan's career modern career
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militarism and aggression had come to an end. Now
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when the occupation began all attention was centered on the fact that it
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was a military occupation because indeed that's what it was in
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form and also because of the recency of the war.
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Everyone expected it to be a military occupation in the
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exact sense of the term. Now on the other hand as things
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developed this military aspect turned out to be the least
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significant segment of the whole operation simply because
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nothing was required except the presence of military
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forces to guarantee the smooth flow of
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the occupation itself. There was nothing which could be regarded as a
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Japanese resistance to the occupation and the
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process of carrying out the disarmament of Japan was
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a very simple one indeed primarily because it was a
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mechanical operation consisting of the demobilisation of what was
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left of the Japanese armed forces and the destruction of the military
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equipment munitions and so forth and so on. I
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suppose that the central significance of the occupation of
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Japan could be described as being the fact that
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it was an operation in what might be termed nation
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rebuilding. We've heard a lot about nation building since the end of the Second World
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War in many parts of the world but in the case of Japan it was a case
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of a nation rebuilding. As I emphasized in the earlier
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lectures of this series Japan did emerge as a modern
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nation by roughly 1500. Indeed that was one of
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the central features of the whole process of modernization that was carried out roughly
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between 1870 and 1900. What
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Japan became involved in as a result of the defeat and the
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occupation was in essence a reorganization of
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its own society a society which by
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1940 certainly had all of the attributes of a modernized
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society. Now also what was involved
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in this operation of nation rebuilding
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was an attempt to change the character of a nation. Now
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that sounds rather extreme but on the other hand by almost
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any reasonable standard this is what has happened in Japan since the end
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of the Second World War. Now I shall not go into
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this process of changing the character of Japan in detail at this point.
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I will simply indicate that what happened was that certain
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features of Japanese society which were regarded as
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undesirable both by the occupation and by the Japanese themselves
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were eliminated or very seriously modified. And
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secondly that certain desirable features new features
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were built in to Japanese society. So even
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this summary statement indicates I think the very great significance of the occupation
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of Japan. Now also the occupation
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presented another extremely interesting problem a problem
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that really has not been satisfactorily studied up to this point.
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Well as a matter of fact I might add that it is
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surprising. But no one has yet made a detailed
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analytical study of the nature of the impact of the
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occupation and indeed of the nature of the occupation itself. There have been a number of
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studies made of certain restricted segments restricted to highly
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important segments of the occupation. But we have yet to see a broad overall
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study. Now what happened was in another
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aspect of the occupation was the development of an
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extremely interesting complex of cultural and
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societal relations. Indeed what happened in the
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occupation was the coming together of two nations of two
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cultures namely the United States and Japan and it is the
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interweaving and the interaction of these two societies or more precisely
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representatives of the society that gives the
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occupation much of its drama and indeed its
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significance. Now as I indicated
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this short span of approximately seven years was a pivotal period in
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Japanese history. It marked the end of the first and the
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major phase of Japan's modern century a century that was
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characterized by the process of modernization and as I've been
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emphasizing militarism and aggression and
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simultaneously It marked the beginning of a new period a period
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still quite brief in historical terms which has been carried terrorized by
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the emergence of democracy and unprecedented economic prosperity
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and a very strong spirit of what is usually referred to as
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pacifism. Now what were some of
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the outward aspects of the occupation. Well in the first
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place it is very important to note as I indicated a moment ago that it
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was essentially an American occupation. It was
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technically an Allied occupation but the United States
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assumed almost the entire burden of the occupation in all
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of its phases. The United States had taken a lead
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the lead I should say in the military offensive against Japan.
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And this meant that there were American forces and American transports
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in the western Pacific that could be gotten into Japan very
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rapidly and that would form the the core of the occupation
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forces. And American general General Douglas MacArthur
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commander of the land forces in the western Pacific was selected to
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be the commander for the occupation. The United States took the
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lead in the surrender negotiations and very importantly
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the United States had taken the lead in the formulation of a policy
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for an occupied Japan. So it was automatic that the
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United States play the leading role in the occupation in the structure
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of the occupation and consequently in this key period of Japanese
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history. Now a second point relating to the
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occupation was a matter of very considerable importance.
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As a matter of fact some allied governments to say nothing
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of the leaders in allied countries felt that it was a
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very sad mistake to maintain the Japanese
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government in administrated control of Japan. Now this was a
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policy decision made primarily by the United States government with the
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approval or the acceptance I should say of its allies.
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This was a matter the maintenance of the Japanese government
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operation was a practical consideration that was forced on the
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allies. Very briefly there were simply not enough
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foreigners American or otherwise who commanded the
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Japanese language sufficiently in all of its aspects. Who knew enough
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about Japan as a society even as an occupied
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society in 1045 effectively to take over
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control of Japan and run what would be would have been referred
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to as an allied military government of the country.
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So the Japanese government was permitted to continue to exist
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and not only that but to continue to operate. Now on the other
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hand the Japanese government had to accept fully
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the supreme authority of the occupation. It is no
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exaggeration to say that everything that the Japanese government
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did from the beginning of the occupation onward had either the exports
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or the implicit approval of the occupation. The
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occupation could tell the Japanese government either that it could
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not do certain things or that it had to do certain other things.
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On the other hand it is a matter of great importance that it was
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a Japanese government and it was a government that continued to
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operate namely to administer the internal affairs of
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Japan itself. Now also I would
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like to say a few things in very general terms about
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the relationship between Japan or the Japanese I should say.
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And the occupation. Now there
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was developed very rapidly at the beginning a very
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interesting problem of the psychological relationship
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between the Japanese people and the occupation.
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Now the problem was essentially that of any
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people who had been fighting bitterly over a considerable
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period of time. Now some of you will recall
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that American attitudes towards Japan during the
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Second World War were to put it very mildly bitter. There was a
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great deal of hatred expressed one way or another on the part of
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Americans towards the Japanese part of this of course grew out of the
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nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Part of it grew out of what were
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unfortunately proven atrocities carried out by the Japanese in certain
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stages of the war against both civilian and military personnel.
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Now in addition to that there was the fact that the fighting
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itself between American and Japanese forces was very bitter costly
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on both sides and very little quarter either asked or given.
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Now also during the course of the war the Japanese government had
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put out carried on I should say and intensive
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anti-American propaganda campaign both at home and
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abroad. And the objective again was to stir up Japanese bitterness
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Japanese hatred of the American enemy and thereby hopefully
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to well lead the Japanese people to resist to the very
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bitter end. Now in other words when the occupation
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began both the Japanese and the Americans well
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expected only the worst from each other. The
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Americans were extremely uneasy. They felt that they might have to
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fight their way into Japan and then constantly be on the alert against
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sabotage or attempts at assassination.
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Japanese have told me that they quite literally took to the hills when the
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occupation began because they were fearful that American troops would
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act just as Japanese propaganda had said that they would act
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indeed had been drumming into the ears of the Japanese people for more than four
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years. All of the evil things that Americans might have done or
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would conceivably do. Now the interesting thing is that very
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rapidly both sides discovered that neither
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was nearly as bad as it had thought that the other was going to
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be. Now the result of this was a very rapid indeed
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reversal of attitudes towards each other and from
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Indeed the opening weeks of the occupation onward. There was nothing but what
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could be described as the friendliest relations between the
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Japanese people and the representatives of the occupation.
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Now also as things worked out the Japanese government and the
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occupation worked together very well. The occupation was
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always willing to discuss problems with the Japanese
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and sometimes it even accepted the Japanese views and
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modified certain actions. It had been planning to take. On the other
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hand the occupation made it perfectly clear to the leaders of Japan at all
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times that they were in complete control and that they were not
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going to change anything in the way of policy that they
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the Americans thought had to be carried out in order to achieve the
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objectives of the occupation. Now as I
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indicated one of the things that the United States had
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when it went into Japan in the occupation was a policy a
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policy that was designed to achieve certain basic objectives
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of the United States government objectives relating to Japan.
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Now I would like to quote briefly the two major
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objectives that were stated in American policy and American policy that was
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released to the world at the end of August in 1945 and
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that proved to be the controlling policy document for all the occupation.
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The first objective of American policy was to
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ensure that Japan will not again become a menace
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to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.
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The second objective was simply I say it was simply but it was
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extremely complex. As you will note the second objective was to
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bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government
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which will respect the rights of other states and will support the
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objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles
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of the charter of the United Nations. The United States desires
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that this government should conform as closely as may be
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to principles of democratic self-government. But
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it is not the responsibility of the Allied powers to impose
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upon Japan any form of government not supported by the
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freely expressed will of the people. So those were the two basic objectives of
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occupation policy. The first one could be described as disarmament and
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demilitarization and the second obviously as a democracy.
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Now this policy also spelled out in some detail what the
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means by which these two objectives were to be achieved.
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The first means was to be disarmament and demilitarization. This was
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very obvious. The second means was the limitation of
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Japan's sovereignty which in layman's language meant simply
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cutting the territory of Japan back to what it was.
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Well approximately at the time that Perry had opened the country back in
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1853 54 or to remove from Japanese
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control all those territories which Japan had
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conquered or occupied by military force. The
[27:18 - 27:23]
third basic means was obviously the encouragement of democracy
[27:23 - 27:28]
in Japan. This was the encouragement in all respects of democracy.
[27:28 - 27:34]
And the fourth means was the development of a peacetime
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economy. Now what the occupation did basically
[27:38 - 27:44]
was to eliminate many aspects of the old order in
[27:44 - 27:48]
Japan to get rid of militarism to get rid of militarist
[27:48 - 27:53]
to eliminate many of the restrictive laws that we were a part of the
[27:53 - 27:58]
authoritarian system that was established. And the second thing
[27:58 - 28:03]
and this was a matter of far greater importance and of what was regarded as
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an almost insuperable difficulty was the introduction of new ideas.
[28:09 - 28:11]
Institutions and practices into Japan.
[28:11 - 28:16]
You have just heard a broadcast on the topic. The occupation of
[28:16 - 28:21]
Japan. The tent for the series titled Japan 1868
[28:21 - 28:26]
through 1968 with John M. Markey professor of government
[28:26 - 28:31]
and vice dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Massachusetts. The
[28:31 - 28:36]
title of the next broadcast in the series is Japan the new democracy
[28:36 - 28:41]
in Japan 1868 through 968 comes to you from
[28:41 - 28:45]
WFC are five College Radio in Amherst
[28:45 - 28:47]
Massachusetts.
[28:47 - 28:51]
This program was distributed by the national educational radio network.
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This program has been transcribed using automated software tools, made possible through a collaboration between the American Archive of Public Broadcasting and Pop Up Archive. Please note that no automated transcription is perfect nor is it intended to replace human transcription labor. If you would like to contribute corrections to this transcript, please contact MITH at mith@umd.edu.